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1. entire text -
2. summary. rwandan fonmin ngulinzira told tanzanian president mwinyi that 
the gor has gone as far as it can and it's up to the observers to lean on the 
rpf. he assured the tanzanians that the gor stands behind the offer it made 
mpungwe - 2 
at arusha III. mwinyi is arranging a meeting with rpf leader kanyarawengwe in 
dar es salaam this weekend to discuss this. rpf negotiator tito remarked 
confidentially to tanzanian delegate at addis jpmc meeting that the rp£ can 
accept the government's current offer as its bottom line, but would naturally 
like to get more. the tanzanians think nmog commander opaleye is being 
unreasonable about both the need for more personnel and the per diem issue, 
and intend to raise this with oau secgen salim. tanzanian mfa africa director 
mpungwe is still trying to manuever fonmin diria out of the chair.man's seat, 
but has low expectations of success. end summary. 
3. following his return from addis ababa, tanzanian mfa director for africa 
and the middle east arne mpungwe (strictly protect) met with poloff to discuss 
the arusha IV round. mpungwe said that foreign minister ngulinzira's visit on 
september 30 had been to relay two messages from president habyarimana: the 
gor stands behind the offer it made at arusha III, but that this is as far as 
it can go. It is now up the the observers to press the rpf to accept the 
government's offer. Mpungwe thought that Ngulinzira seemed sincere, but there 
is probably some give in the government's position, though not much. 
4. mpungwe added that president mwinyi had decided to ask rpf leader 
kanyarawengwe to visit dar es salaam before the next round opens. He expects 
President Mwinyi will relay the GoR position in his usual low-key manner and 
ask that the rpf consider it seriously. Also, RPF negotiator rudasingwe is in 
town to meet with the MFA. 
5. speaking of the addis jpmc meeting, mpungwe noted that the rpf's antics 
had been amusing but not helpful. The Tanzanians had brought BG Christopher 
Gimonge, their director of Military Intelligence, to discuss military issues. 
They were disappointed with the RPF's failure to bring any military advisors 
to the session. They are also a bit upset with Nigerian General Opaleye for 
his demands for more men and rather over-generous per diem. Mpungwe said he 
agreed completely with the U.S. observer's remarks about the OAU pricing 
itself out of the peacekeeping business. Mpungwe plans to see OAU SecGen 
Salim Salim in Gabarone around October 15, when the OAU Ad Hoc committee on 
Aapartheid meets, and raise Opaleye's requests with him if they are not 
resolved beforehand. 
6. but, mpungwe said, the most interesting thing which occurred at addis was 
that after the formal jpmc session mpungwe had a private tete-a-tete with rpf 
negotiator tito ------ mpungwe states that tito assured him the rpf would, 
as its bottom line, accept the gor's offer pretty much as it stands. polo££ 
mpungwe - 3 
relayed the substance of ambassador carson's meeting with rpf chairman 
kanyarawengwe and said this seemed to corroborate what he heard in addis, but 
we agreed that the rpf's extreme distrust of president habyarimana and its 
feeling that their security can only be assured by stripping the president of 
most of his power remain serious obstacles. 
7. And in our continuing comedy subplot, i.e., the effort to find another 
facilitator to replace Diria, Mpungwe says he is still working on it, but it's 
getting convoluted. He thinks he has enlisted Chief Secretary Paul Rupia in 
an effort to persuade President Mwinyi that his foreign minister is 
desparately needed to uphold Tanzanian interests at the UNGA. Or in South 
Africa. Or China .... As a fallback he has enlisted a wise old mzee, whom he 
believes Diria will actually respect, to try to talk some sense to the 
minister about keeping his mouth shut, not getting into arguments with the 
parties, and letting the Rwandans do the negotiating. 
8. comment: all in all, we think have grounds for confidence that the two 
sides may make more substantial progress in Arusha IV, provided the RPF can be 
persuaded to desist in its posturing and both parties can focus on negotiating 
a settlement as opposed to scoring points off each other. Mpungwe says that 
despite their behavior at Addis both sides assured him at the end that they 
will come to Arusha prepared for serious discussions. We can only hope it's 
true. As for the effort to depose everyone's favorite facilitator, we think 
Rupia is much too smart and much too happy in his current job to risk trying 
to cross the President's best after-mosque schmoozing buddy. Nor do we think 
efforts to train him are going to have much success; Diria's not ineducable, 
but he is very dense. 
ewing## 
Arusha IV: First Day 
The parties trickled into Arusha during the day on October 5, with the RPF 
delegation delayed in Uganda by problems with their travel documents (if true, 
a point to raise with the Ugandans) . The mood was of anticipation mixed with 
concern. The Tanzanians feels that the GoR really cannot give much more 
ground than they already have, and they suspect that the RPF will make one 
more stab with its Presidential Council idea and set back the talks before 
they get started. President Mwinyi saw Chairman Kanyarengwe this morning in 
Dar es Salaam and urged that the RPF be flexible. 
The plan for the evening of the 5th is, if the RPF arrives, to have a brief 
session to confirm the areas of agreement from the last round, discuss the 
agenda for the coming round, and then get to the substance October 6. 
Mbapila, making the rounds of the observers, asked for suggestions. Poloff 
emphasized the need to focus the talks on specifics. Everyone seemed to agree 
on what the problems were in general terms, but the solutions to those 
problems had to be formulated in terms of concrete arrangements. The RPF 
needed to get clarifications of how exactly the government's proposal would 
work; the GoR, in its turn, had to be able to provide the concrete details 
that would indicate whether its proposals really addressed the RPF's 
concerns. Mbapila bemoaned the propensity of the francophone Africans to 
phrase their propositions in vague statements of sweeping principles, saying 
"we have a lot of problems with that at the OAU." But there may be more to 
this than a tendency towards generalizations. Clearly the two parties are 
speaking in a kind of code; the general term "the state powers" may not have 
the same meaning for both. Looking at how the RPF reacted to the phrase, 
"legal acts of the president" in the GoR's proposal (the RPF suspected a trap 
-- what about illegal acts or extralegal acts?) it is possible that what 
really concerns the RPF is the President's ability to just pick up a 
telephone, issue orders, and make things happen no matter what the 
constitution says. 
Second Day at Arusha IV (October 6) 
1. Summary. The Government presented the details of its proposals for a 
transitional reg~e in the morning plenary. These involved transfer much of 
the President's powers to a more powerful Prime Minister, while leaving the 
President a substantial role in the promulgation of decrees and legislation, 
in convening the Cabinet, and in submitting legislation to the National 
Assembly. In the afternoon, the RPF responded with a more detailed exposition 
of their ideas for a National Presidential Council, with three RPF members, 
and one from each of the other coalition parties (including the President as 
the MRND member) . In the evening, GoR Fonmin Ngulinzira was just getting 
warmed up to his rebuttal when the power failed, forcing an early adjournment 
for the day. 
2. The second day got off to a slow start, with the facilitator spending much 
of the morning in lengthy consultations with the two sides. The Tanzanians 
persuaded both parties to forego long (and possibly contentious opening 
statements) and try instead to pick up directly where they left off. Rwandan 
Foreign ~nister Ngulinzira opened the plenary with a rather long set of 
"introductory remarks," to which the RPF's Bizimungu made a mercifully brief 
reply. Tanzanian MFA Principal Secretary Mbapila urged the GoR to move 
directly to discussion of power-sharing in the Executive, picking up from the 
end of the last session. 
3. Thus prompted, Ngulinzira laid out the following details, amplifying the 
government's Arusha III proposal: 
-- The President, in his capacity as Head of State, would exercise the 
following powers: 
Naming the Prime ~nister and receiving his resignation; 
Appointing the other members of the Government proposed by the Prime 
Minister; 
-- Accrediting Ambassadors and Envoys, who would be appointed by the Pr~e 
Minister, and receiving the accreditations of foreign ambassadors; 
Formally representing the Republic in its relations with the outside world; 
Sanctioning and Promulgating laws passed by the National Assembly within 15 
days after their constitutionality has been approved by the Constitutional 
Court; 
In urgent situations, the Government may make decrees which are then 
sanctioned and promulgated by the Head of State; 
-- The Head of State may veto laws proposed by the National Assembly and 
return them to the assembly for review within 15 days of his veto. If the 
Assembly passes the law again, and it is again pronounced constitutional, then 
the President must sanction and promulgate the law. 
Exercising the right of pardon; 
Appointing magistrates following the advice of the Supreme Court and the 
Supreme Council of the Legislature. 
Some of the powers of the President would be exclusive; other actions may not 
be taken unless on advice of the Cabinet and the Bureau of the National 
Assembly, such as: 
Dissolving the Assembly; 
Submitting draft laws or any issue to a referendum; 
Declaring war or promulgating amnesties. 
4. Ngulinzira concluded that the Government felt the prerogatives of the Head 
of State could not really be shared but that his powers could be limited; he 
suggested that further limits were possible. On relations between the 
President and the Government (i.e., the Cabinet), Ngulinzira proposed the 
following powers for the Prime Minister of the Broad-based Transitional 
Government (BBTG) : 
-- chairing cabinet meetings (currently, the 
President could convene and chair cabinet 
concerned required the approval of the cabinet 
action; 
President does) . However, the 
meetings whenever the issues 
or the national assembly for 
determining national policies in consultation with the parties represented 
in the cabinet; 
presenting the government's program to the national assembly, as well as 
the members of the cabinet; 
directing all government activities and establishing the agenda for cabinet 
meetings which he chairs, and so informing the President; 
-- fixing the powers and authorities of the Ministers and the secretaries of 
state, and determining the nature and competencies of the services under their 
authority; 
-- appointing civilian and military officials. In particular cases determined 
by law where such appointments remained the prerogative of the president, the 
president would make such appointments upon the recommendation of the Prime 
Minister as agreed to by the Cabinet; 
countersigning laws adopted by the national assembly for promulgation by 
the President; 
--executing the laws and regulations. The Prime Minister's decrees would be 
decided on by the consensus of the Cabinet. 
5. The BBTG would have the following powers: 
en~uring the ~plementation of the laws, and taking control of the civil 
administration and the ar.my; 
-- negotiating and concluding treaties and agreements with foreign countries, 
such agreements to be submitted to the President for ratification. However, 
peace treaties, alliances, treaties affecting the borders or soveriegnty of 
the nation, or having financial ~plications for the government would not 
become effective until approved by the national assembly and promulgated by 
the President; 
drafting laws for submission to the National Assembly; 
In emergencies, drafting decrees for direct promulgation by the President; 
adopting decrees submitted by the President or the Prime ~nister regarding 
the ~plementation of the laws; 
approving appointments to senior civil and military positions; 
-- adopting acts relating to the printing of currency; the President would 
have the power to print money but only with the concurrence of the Cabinet 
(comment: they've been thinking about Zaire); 
6. Ngulinzira concluded by saying that the GoR would be glad to consider any 
amendments the RPF might wish to make to their proposals, and offered to 
provide them as a document of the conference. Chairman Mbapila suggested that 
the conference defer the production of papers for the moment and suggested 
that the RPF reflect on the proposals and provide their thoughts in the 
afternoon plenary. 
7. In the afternoon plenary, Chair.man Mbapila turned the floor over to RPF 
delegation head Biz~ungu. He began by referring to Articles 35, 39, and 57 
of the current constitution, under which the President exercised power with 
the assistance of the government, ensured the functioning and continuity of 
state institutions, was the arbiter between state institutions, and the 
gaurantor of national unity, and in which legislative authority was 
collectively vested in the President and the National Assembly. Bizimungu 
said that executive powers could be shared either by transferring them to 
other institutions, by ensuring collective decision-making, or by some 
combination of these techniques. He remarked that the RPF preferred 
collective decision-making but would not be "dogmatic" on that point. But he 
insisted that mechanisms had to be found to ensure that power-sharing 
arrangements would be operative during a transition. 
8. Biz~ungu then went through the government's proposals, point by point, 
claiming either that they were too vague, or simply duplicated provisions of 
the current constitution that had already proved incapable of effectively 
restraining the president, as shown by the Prime Minister's letter of 
September 22. He emphasized that he was not rejecting the government's offer, 
merely commenting on it. Ngulinzira attempted to further clarify the 
proposals, stating that their goal was to ensure that the president could not 
make decisions alone, that the Cabinet had to be involved. He agreed that 
some of the provisions reflected the current constitution but pointed out that 
this constitution had created a certain level of power-sharing already. 
Bizimungu replied that the RPF did not care to be offered the June 10 
constitution. He referred to the Prime Minister's letter of September 22, and 
to the problems cited there with the President refusing to assent to 
appointments or decrees offered by the current Cabinet, thus stymying the 
government. Therefore the RPF preferred its National Presidential Council 
(NPC), whose seven members (including President Habyarimana) would exercise 
power collectively. All the current powers of the President would be 
exercised, during the transition, by the NPC. Under the RPF proposal, the NPC 
would: 
--promulgate the laws passed by the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) and 
sanctioned by the Cabinet; 
--together with the TNA, initiate new legislation; 
--become the guarantor of the nation's sovereignty, unity and independence and 
of the independence of the judiciary; 
--address messages to the nation; 
--excercise the right of control over the government; 
--become the arbiter between the institutions of state; 
--assume the powers of appointment granted the president; 
--appoint the judiciary; 
--command the armed forces; 
--declare was and sign amnesties, in accordance with the advice and approval 
of the Cabinet and the TNA; 
--declare states of seige or emergency, upon approval of the TNA; 
--control the printing of currency; 
--exercise a suspensive veto over legislation; 
The government would be . left with proposing the budget to the NPC, and 
drafting presidential decrees for approval and promulgation by the NPC. 
Bizimungu finally suggested that because it included the parties as well as 
President Habyarimana, it could be called the "Broad-based Presidential 
Council." On that note, the plenary broke for tea. 
9. During the break, the observers met briefly with the facilitators. The 
consensus was that while we had more clearly defined the positions of the two 
sides little real progress had been made. The government had elaborated its 
scheme to subsume Habyarimana in the Cabinet and strengthen the Cabinet and 
the Prime Minister; the RPF had replayed its proposal for a Council of 
National Reconciliation, repackaged as the NPC. When the plenary reconvened, 
Ngulinzira criticized the RPF proposal for needlessly duplicating existing 
institutions. He noted that it was not clear where in the hierarchy the 
members of the NPC would fit. He pointed out that the Government's proposals 
entailed a series of amendments to the current constitution to make the system 
work effectively. Mechanisms would be established to ensure that "the fate of 
the nation was not in hands of one man." He pointed out that because the 
President would be given only a suspensive veto, he would be unable to do more 
than delay any initiative of the Cabinet or the Assembly. The RPF was 
proposing an unweildy new structure that might be a new source of conflicts 
and confusion. 
10. And at that point the power failed. With the plenary plunged into 
darkness amid caustic remarks about "power sharing" in Tanzania, the Chairman 
called it a day. 
11. Comment: For the moment, the two sides appeared to have entrenched 
themselves in their current positions. And the scuttlebutt from the Ugandan 
observer is that the RPF is being strongly supported in its NPC idea by the 
opposition parties in Kigali, and may be operating on the assumption that if 
it holds out long enough, the internal conflicts within the government will 
force it to yield, at least to the extent of negotiating on the basis of the 
RPF's proposal. The government, on its side, seems to be counting on observer 
and regional (i.e., Ugandan) pressure to make the RPF more reasonable. 
Although RPF reps have told several observers now that they are willing to 
flexible about the GoR's proposal provided it can be amended to meet their 
concerns, their presentations of October 6 indicate they intend to fight for 
every clause. 
ewingti 
Draft cable text: 
Arusha IV: October 7 
1. Summary. During the morning emboff met over breakfast and coffee 
with Amb. Kanyarashoki of the GOR delegation and later with Bizimungu 
and Mazimhaka of the RPF. In the plenary that morning, the Government 
went still further in amplifying and explaining its proposal, suggesting 
that it would effectively check any attempt by the President to exercise 
power unilaterally. Fonmin Ngulinzira noted that the Constitution 
provided an ultimate sanction impeachment if the President 
violated the constitution or the peace accord. The RPF, rather than 
respond in plenary, accepted the chair's offer for private consultations 
with the government, which continued through the evening. Initial 
reports from these indicated that the two sides continued to more 
clearly define their concerns and how their proposals would work but 
without closing the gaps between their positions. end summary. 
2. At breakfast with dar es salaam polo££ bentley and German observer 
Amb. Ventslaff on October 7, Rwandan delegate Amb. Kanyaroshoki 
indicated that the GOR felt the RPF was demanding executive powers for 
itself, going beyond what the Government could offer. He wondered if 
the RPF was fixated on its proposal for a National Presidential Council 
(NPC) because they had certain leaders who refused to enter the 
government as "mere ministers." He thought, however, that the 
objections the RPF raised about the President's ability to obstruct the 
process or do end runs around the government and the constitution 
represented real concerns. He felt that the government's proposals 
addressed these concerns by making it impossible for Habyarimana to act 
legally without the consent of the cabinet or the transitional 
legislature, and by moving much of his executive authority into the 
cabinet. Asked how the GOR could address the concerns about the 
President violating the constitution or reneging on an agreement, 
Kanyaroshoki said that if the President did so he could be impeached. 
4. Later that morning, RPF negotiators Bizimungu and Maz±rnhaka detailed 
their problems with the GOR proposal. The RPF felt that the GOR offer 
was simply a repackaging of the current constitution and really did 
little to prevent the President from abusing his powers or reneging on 
the peace agreement. They thought that the President would continue to 
obstruct and frustrate the process, even to the extent of continuing the 
killings which they claimed were still going on in Kibuye. They feared 
that the President, whatever the government agreed to, would use terror 
tactics and his control of groups like the MRND youth to abort the 
transition. Without mentioning what Kanyaroshoki had said about 
impeaching the President (God alone knows how that will play in Kigali), 
poloff suggested that the RPF should raise these concerns with the GOR 
negotiators, and should try to find out how far the GOR was willing to go 
to address them. 
5. At the morning plenary, with Tanzanian MFA principal Secretary 
Mbapila in the chair, Rwandan Fonmin Ngulinzira offered further details 
on how power would be transferred from the President to the government 
(i.e., the Cabinet) and would be exercised through the transition. He 
made clear that the GOR envisioned constitutional amendments that would 
leave to Habyarimana the honor of approving those decisions and actions 
and appointments that the Cabinet or the legislature wanted approved. 
The suspensive veto was exactly that a means by which Habyarimana 
could suspend action and force a reconsideration, but could not block 
action. Finally, he noted that if the President violated the 
constitution or the ter.ms of the peace agreement, if he sought to block 
implementation of government policies by refusing to decrees where the 
constitution required that he do so, the impeachment process offered a 
remedy. 
6. The RPF, somewhat surprised by Ngulinzira's broaching of the threat 
of impeachment as a control on President Habyarimana's behavior, accepted 
the offer of Chair.man Mbapila to consult privately with the GOR 
delegation to seek further clarification. The plenary then adjourned. 
7. The private consultations between the GOR and RPF delegations 
continued through the evening of October 7. Early reports suggested that 
they were continuing to define and amplify their positions and concerns 
but that neither side showed much signs of movement. 
October 9 
Fomin Diria has had to take a quick trip to Zanzibar· for a party 
meeting. Rawson urged him to let someone else chair the plenary so that 
observers could at least get a sense of where closed-door discussions 
were leading and could encourage negotiating parties to speed their 
efforts. The idea of an afternoon plenary was accepted,but it turned 
into a late evening meeting 
At dinner, Tanzanian Ambassador Mpungwe told Rawson that they, as 
facilitator, had stopped the speech-making, had told the Government that 
there should be no documents presented until there was basic agreement on 
substance of agreement and had encouraged direct contact between 
parties. Having witnessed the desire on one party or another to seek 
support for their case from observers, the faciltator had told them to 
them to work out their own solutions. This was the origin of Prin. 
Secretary Mbapila's caution to observers to let negotiators alone in this 
"delicate stage of negotiations." 
October 10 
Fomin Ngulinzira told Rawson that it appeared that negotiators were at 
an impasse. The government had offered a complete schema for allocation 
of respective power critical to the transition process. But the RPF was 
requiring a complete devloution of all presidential power leaving 
Habyarimana only with a ceremonial role. This was not acceptable back in 
Kigali. Rawson told Fomin that plenary ought to meet to hear where 
things stood. 
When plenary met in AM, Fomin on behalf of negotiators went down list 
of items (12) on which there was convergence, items (5) on which there 
was partial convergence and items (10) on which there was disagreement. 
He prefaced his remarks by noting that the main issue was the role of the 
president in decision making. RPF seemed to want total transfer of power 
to Government. Government proposal was based on a semi-presidential 
system, political efficacy and separation of powers. Two principles 
guide their negotiating posture: negotiations must go on, and, 
negotiations should produce a balancing out of powers among government 
institutions. It has been agreed that the President will be involved 
at least in a nominating of officilaizing role in minting of money, 
giving pardon, designatingnational orders ofmerit, signingtreaties, 
receiving oaths. Areas of divergence include role of President as 
guarantor of national sovereignty and judicial independence, delivering 
messages to the nation, representing the state in relations with other 
states, declaration of war or making peace, implementation of laws, being 
chief of armed forces, proclamation of emergency and dissolution of 
National Assembly. 
Commissioner Mazimhaka responded for RPF. RPF was trying to improve 
on proposal the government presented. They had no intention to exclude 
any party or any person from contributing to the success of the 
transition. They wanted to insure that no party or person could block 
the transition process. Mechanisms cf government should be efficient, 
transparent and broad-based. They wanted to avoid pitfalls of too 
extensive consultation with possibilities of delaying legislation or 
tabling of counter legislation which could have a disastrous effect on 
impetus toward transition. The head of state may have perogatives, but 
he should share his powers with other forces in the executive. The 
ability of the President to challenge cabinet is a power. They sought 
from the government side a clearer definition of how they distinguished 
perogatives and powers. At the meeting's end, Fomin Ngulinzira said 
government was attracted by RPF idea of President exercising power in 
cabinet and of looking again at other perogatives to make sure they were 
carefully defined. 
During a break in plenary, Rawson told Fomin Ngulinzira and Fomin 
Diria that there appeared to be lot of progress and quite a few things 
parties could push forward toward convergence even if areas of 
disagreement were left in abeyance. He recommended that the parties meet 
again in head-to-head negotiation, while the secretariat tabulated for 
the record the areas on which they had agreed. On resumption of the 
plenary, this was given as the order of procedure. 
Monday, October 12. 
Closed door discussions continued Saturday afternoon and Sunday. 
Parties reported they were making progress on several issues. In 
comments to all parties, Rawson reiterated the theme that negotiated 
positions must deal with RPF concerns but will be meaningless unless they 
also satisfy the major political forces in Rwanda. Sunday afternoon's 
plenary was pushed back to Monday morning. At the beginning of that 
session, Amb. Mpungwe announced that there would be no technical 
discussion of military integration at the end of this negotiating 
session. Then, Commissioner Bizimungu took the floor to brief observers 
on behalf of both delegations. They had decided that the current 
president would remain in place until elections at the end of the interim 
period. The President should exercise certain perogatives and 
participate in decision making but executive power would be exercised 
collectively in the Council of Ministers. The Prime Minister would 
direct the actions of government but the President could add items to 
the government agenda and participate in council if he wished--in such a 
case, he would preside over Council. 
The President would have no veto power and would have to sign decrees 
and laws within ten days of their certification by the Consititional 
Court. Presidential acts are countersigned as appropriate by the prime 
miniter and the relevant minister. The President can name the Prime 
Minister and other ministers, name ambassadors, represent Rwanda abroad, 
sign pardons, orders to mint money, national awards, and treaties. The 
right to propose laws goes to the Council of Ministers and the national 
Assembly. Nomination of civil servants will depend on their rank. 
Nomination of military officers will be discussed in the integration 
negotiations. Declarations of a state of emergency, of war or of 
armistice must betaken in the Council of Ministers and approved by the 
National Assembly. 
Areas yet to be resolved regarded who is guarantor of national unity 
and judicial independence, who gets to address the nation, who is chief 
of ar.med forces, who has the power to dissolve the national assembly, 
what it the for.mula ofthe oath of office although it is agreed that it 
will be sworn before the president, what is the modality to determine the 
program of the government and what happens when the Presidency is vacated. 
Tuesday, October 13 
Fomin Diria announced that he had to leave for OAU Ad Hoc Summit on 
South Africa; Ambassador Fall would temporarily chair. Diria handed out 
a statement from the chair prolonging the political negotiations beyond 
October 10 and urging respect of the ceasefire, something we had been 
after him to do since last week. OAU Assistant Sec Gen Maparanga 
reported that all six NMOG . contingents were in Kigali and should be 
deployed to the front by the week-end. There would be no emergency 
meeting of the JPMC, but one might be called at the snd of this 
negotiating session. 
Fomin Ngulinzira presented the results of negotiations. The two 
parties had decided that the preident would sanction and promulgate laws 
without right of veto within tens days after their constitutionality was 
certified. The Council of Ministers would decided on declarations of war 
and peace which would be authorized by the National Assembly but 
declaration made by the President. The President and Pr~e Minister 
would address to the nation messages whose contents had been apporved in 
Ministerial Council. There had been agreement on the formula for oaths. 
The Government in Council of Ministers would safeguard national 
sovereignty, assure the national defense and organize the armed forces. 
The Pr~e Minister would declare national emergencies. 
The parties had not yet agreed on issues regarding independence of the 
judiciary, especially who names judges; on whether the President would be 
Commander-in-Chief; on who signs nominating papers to civilian positions; 
on what to do in case of Presidential vacancy; on how the National 
Assembly is dissolved; on the choice of Pr~e Minister, and on 
establishing the national program 
After the plenary, on a friendly visit the local produce market, 
Rawson raised with Ugandan Vice-Foreign Minister Didi, his concern that 
government had given away significant presidential powers in the last 
negotiating session, especially his emergency powers and that RPF ought 
to concede the Commander-in-Chief title if they wanted Habyarimana to be 
brought into the process rather than alienated from it. Such a 
concession would win them a lot of manoevering room on other issues. The 
Minister said he would try to talk to the "boys" about it. 
Wednesday, October 14 
In conversation over a goat chew, 
that Rawson's arguments had convinced h~ 
the Commander-in-Chief title; he was 
leave that perogative to the President. 
Didi had arrange RPF's acquiescence.) 
Vice-Minister Didi told Amb. Fall 
that Habyar~ana should retain 
glad that the RPF had agreed to 
(The unspoken ~port was that 
Later that afternoon, Fomin Ngulinzira told Rawson that issues 
relating to presidential power had all been decided. The Council of 
Ministers meeting in Kigali had endorsed everything the negotiators had 
decided. MRND Ministers were part of that consensus. Questions of how 
to replace the CND, how to elect or nominate the inter~ National 
Assembly, and how to ensure independence to the judiciary remained to be 
discussed. He thought they might agree to reinstitute the Supreme Court 
and showed Rawson a draft proposal which jurists from both sides had 
worked out together. 
Rawson congratulated the Foreign Minister on his successful 
negotiations and suggested the possibility of an enlarged assembly 
incorporating rather than replacing the CND as one possible approach to 
the legislative problem. 




conversation with UNDP ResRep Ndaw, Rawson stressed the 
of international supervision of the fragile, unstable process 
peace and democracy in Rwanda. He also mentioned the 
that international bodies and neighboring counties make all 
necesary arrangements for compiance with the Dar es Salaam agreement on 
refugees since peace might be soon at hand and Rwanda will be prepared to 
carry out its side of the bargain. Rawson made the same points later 
with OAU Sec Gen Mapuranga. 
Thursday, October 15 
Over a long breakfast, Dr. Rudasingwa shared his 7iews of the 
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negotiations with Rawson. Rudasingwa said the RPF were satisfied with 
discussions on Presidential powers which had been the most critical area 
for them. He felt that their particular concerns had been adequately 
covered. There should be no major problems on judiciary or the National 
Assembly. Rudasingwa noted RPF's concern to bring refugees back on to 
the political agenda at some point. 
Rawson asked whatever happened to the idea of having local elections 
so as to have local officials whom the people could really trust, an idea 
Kagame had raised in Kampala. Rudasingwa said that local officials 
initially would be appointed but RPF favored electing them as soon as 
practicable. Rawson wondered to what extent the RPF wanted to push an 
"assainisement administrative." Rudasingwa said RPF did not want 
wholesale changes, only changes in essential ministries or among those 
local officials who were not adequately preforming their duties. Rawson 
noted. the trade off between rapid structural change which brought 
instability with attendant administrative inefficiencies and maintenance 
of a status quo in existing structures and office holders which 
discouraged hopes for effective change. He noted the importance of a 
continual international presence guaranteeing the interim process to keep 
unstable interim political conditions from degenerating into political 
violence, if not civil war or genocide. 
In plenary session at 7pm, Commissioner Bizimungu briefed observers on 
negotiating progress. Items regarding executive power had been decided, 
except for the question of presidential vacancy and who dissolves the 
National Assembly which had been rewerved to another time. Bizimungu 
confir.med the the president would be Commander-in-Chief and that the 
Supreme Court would be recreated, thus finessing the question as to who 
is guardian of judicial independence and appoints judges. Decidions in 
government would be by consensus but after a second reading would be by 
wo-thirds majority, except for questions of defense, security and 
amending the peace accord--all of which require consensus. Executive 
powers breakdown as follows: 
The President: 
--Remains commander-in-chief of the ar.med forces; 
--Represents the state in foreign relations 
war or ar.mistices, and receives ambassadors; 
signs treaties, declares 
--Sanctions and promulgates laws (but without a veto) within ten days of 
their constituitonal certification; 
--Signs nominations of Chancellier de l'Ordre National, Governor of the 
Central bank, his own Director of Cabinet and personal secretary and 
counsellors, Rector of the University, Ambassadors, Secretaries-General, 
Directors of Cabinet, Ministerial Councellors; 
--Signs pardons and orders to print money; 
--Can add his concerns to the Council of Minister's agenda, attend and 
chair meetings as desired; 
--May address to the nation a message whose contents have been approved 
by the Council of Ministers. 
The Prime ~nister 
--Convokes, chairs and directs the work of the Council of Ministers and 
elaborates the program of the government; 
--Chooses members of the government and sets their responsibilities; 
--Signs nominations of Vice Rector of the University, his counsellors, 
prefets, sous-prefets, Bourgemestres, ministerial directors-general, 
directors of public enterprises, administrators of mixed companies; 
--Countersigns laws and decrees; 
--Procla~s a state of emergency; 
--May address to the nation a message whose contents have been approved 
by the Council of ~nisters. 
The Government: 
--Determines national policy and assures its implementation; 
--Issues legal decrees when the national assembly is not in session; 
--Names persons to civil service positions; 
--Safeguards the nation and guarantees its sovereignty. 
Yet to be examined are powers of the Vice-Pr~e ~nister, the larger 
outline of the interim government program, means of forming the 
government and specifics about the specialized commissions. All aspects 
of the National Assembly of Transition have to be considered. The 
negotiators projected that they would have concluded their negotiations 
and be ready for signature of a protocol by Thursday the 22nd of 
October. After the meeting, Fomin Ngulinzira told observers that they 
hoped to have the regular monthly meeting of the JPMC in Arusha on 
October 22 and 23 so as to save time and money since so many of the 
participants were already here. 
October 20-21 
The two parties remained closeted with each other, essentially 
deadlocked during this period over.the issue of the transitional national 
assembly and the actual arrangements for distributing portfolios within 
the transtional cabinet. On October 20 the government team referred the 
issue back to Kigali for further instructions; on the 21st, Ambassador 
Kanyarushoke told Rawson that the Government had decided on a formula for 
classifying ministries into three categories: national soveriegnty 
(defense, foreign affairs, internal affairs); economics and development 
(transportation and communications, public works, finance, et al); social 
services (education, health, et al) . The RPF would be guaranteed at 
least one ministry in the first category (either defense or interior), 
and one or two ministries in the others. No political party would have 
more than two ministries in ·any one category. The GOR felt that this 
plan should be incorporated into the peace agreement but that the actual 
distribution of portfolios should await the formation of the transitional 
government and be handled by the prime minister. The GOR also insisted 
that the peace agreement confirm the current prime minister (nsengyaremwe 
(?)) in his office. 
In the late evening of the 21st RPF negotiator Theogen Rudasingwa told 
Bentley and AF/RA military advisor Marley that this formula for cabinet 
power sharing was acceptable to the RPF. But they insisted that they had 
to agree on which party would get which ministry in advance and that this 
agreement be incorporated into the peace agreement. They also objected 
to the peace agreement being use to confirm the current P.M. in his 
office; they felt that in principle the peace agreement should provide 
for parties to get portfolios but that individuals should not be named. 
We had the feeling that Rudasingwa was really saying that the political 
opposition and perhaps elements within his own party were not entirely 
happy with the P.M. and were seeking an opportunity to depose him. 
Throughout the two days, in casual contacts with both the government 
and RPF team members, Rawson and other observers urged the two parties to 
seek ways around the impasse on the national assembly. Foreign Minister 
Ngulinzira, speaking to US Rep Rawson the morning of the 21st, described 
he government's current offer as a bicameral house, with the current CND 
retained as the lower house to deal with administrative law, while an 
appointed upper house would be created that would have the right to 
review and approve of legislation from the CND, and also would handle 
matters relating to the constitution and the peace agreement. The RPF 
felt that the government was attempting to retain the CND in its current 
form and that this was an unacceptable step back from its earlier 
commitment to a transtional national assembly. Xhey felt that the 
government's argument that it would be undemocratic to replace an 
"elected" assembly with an appointed body did not wash; Rudasingwa noted 
(and US Reps had to agree) that 'l.he m1rrent CND, .as a ·single-party 
assembly whose candidates had faced .no political competition and had been 
selected by the MRND hierarchy, was hardly a democratic or representative 
body in the way those terms are commonly understood. However, Rep Rawson 
also observed that the GOR offer was a reasonable way to try to 
accomodate both the RPF's concerns as well as MRND requirements in a 
transitional mechanism. 
During their late sitting with Rudasingwa, Bentley and Marley also 
introduced the topics of military integration and the need to start 
thinking about the long-term, post-transitional arrangements. Marley 
provided Rudasingwa with copies of the Angolan and Mozambican agreements 
on military integration, together with an analysis by USLO Luanda of some 
of the problems and pitfalls that had been encountered in implementing 
the Angolan agreement. Bentley remarked that it was also time for the 
Rwandan leaders on both sides to start thinking about post-transition 
arrangements. As long as Rwandans continued to identify themselves by 
enthnicity the real danger of the Tutsi becoming an isolated permanent 
minority remained. Arrangements had to be developed that would 
incorporate the Tutsis into a broad, moderate center that would also 
embrace a majority of Hutus, thus isolating ethnic supremacists on the 
fringes. The politics had to be designed to work in such a way as to 
penalize rather than reward appeals to ethnicity; the situation to avoid 
was the Sri Lankan disaster, where a system of majoritarian democracy 
made ethnic accommodation impossible because any Sinhalese party that 
tried to reach an agreement with Tamils would be accused by the other 
Sinhalese parties of selling out. 
Finally, Rudasingwa said that if agreement could not be finalized at 
this session, then perhaps it was time for a face-to-face meeting between 
President Habyarimana and RPF Chairman Kanyarengwe. This might be the 
only way to resolve the outstanding issues in a manner that would 
definitively commit both parties. US Reps' reaction to this (not shared 
with Rudasingwa) was that the RPF may be stalling on the negotiations in 
order to try to force such a meeting. 
Thursday, October 22 
At breakfast on the 22nd RPF negotiators told the US Reps that they 
had responded to the governments proposals regarding distribution of 
government portfolios and the government would this morning meet with 
them to go over the issue. It might be that they would be able to reach 
agreement on cabinet portfolios and to "put that in their pocket." In 
addition to cabinet portfolios, remaining items of business on power 
sharing included agreement on how the peace accord fits into the 
constitution and agreement on how the national assembly is set up and how 
it is to operate. Rawson said he hoped the negotiators could move 
forward today; there were some practical proposals out on the table that 
could serve as useful ways of meeting each side's concerns. Rudasingwa 
said that there might be some surprises by the end of the day. 
Later Rawson met privately with Amb. Kanyarushoki. Kanyarushoki said 
the RPF wanted to designate portfolios right now, but the government was 
concerned about the effect on ministerial authority in this time of 
instability if, two months before the interim arrangements were set up, 
certain ministers were known to be on the way out.. Rawson suggested 
that they agree on modalities of choice and commit themselves to dividing 
portfolios after the talks on military integration but before the final 
accord is signed. Kanyarushoki said that looked like a useful compor.mise. 
Rawson also met with Commissioner Bizimungu. When Rawson hoped that 
there might be break-throughs today on pending issues, Bizimungu said one 
should not expect to end up things today. Rawson said he was not talking 
about final wrap up but about moving forward on practical ideas that 
could bridge current differences. Bizimungu said we would have to wait 
and see what the gover.ment's response was on ministerial portfolios. 
Bentley and Rawson joined in an after dinner conversation between RPF 
Mazimphaka and Ugandan Vice-Minister Didi. They tried to stress the 
importance ofcoming up with a formula that co-opted the MRND and its 
members in the CND into the peace process rather than left them outside 
where they might try to undermine it. Mazimpaka said that sounded like 
black mail. Rawson and Bentley pointed out that an elected body, even if 
elected within a one-party system could not be dismissed out of hand; it 
had a right to ask why it should be replaced by the arbitrary porcess of 
nomination. The Minister reiterated his idea of keeping the CND in place 
but neutralizing their impact with appointed members. Mazimpaka saw this 
as an expensive and clumsy arrangement. 
After Mazimmpaka left for talks with the other side, 
Friday, October 23 
On the way to breakfast, Fomin Ngulinzira asked if we could convince the 
RPF to agree on modalities for dividing up government portfolios now and 
to specifically assign portfolios just before the peace agreement was to 
be signed. Rawson noted that that might depend on what the government 
was asking as a solution to the remaining problem--the InterLm National 
Assembly. The Minister said they were not really ready to discuss that 
except to perhpas explore some possible scenarios. the government was 
now thinking of proposing a nominated National Assembly in which all 
parties and interest groups were represented, one seat or two for smaller 
groups and several seats for larger parties. Rawson asked if they had 
given up on the idea of indirect elections and popular representation. 
The Minister reported that the Council of Ministers was meeting today to 
discuss that issue. He would not be in a position to ·make a concrete 
offer until after he had talked with his Prime Minister. Following her 
call to Kigali, Carol Fuller confirmed that in the President's meeting 
with parties yesterday, those present asked that if the CND was not to be 
replace by elections that they be named to the new Assembly. the council 
of Ministers was discussing the issue. 
Saturday, October 24 
After breakfast, Andrew Rwigamba briefed Rawson and Bentley on thr RPF 
position. They wanted a definitive distribution of porfolios made 
throughnegotioations in Arusha at this round. They did not believe they 
could Simply entrust this to the Prime Minister's choosing. However, it 
might be possible to wait until after the military negotiations as long 
as ministerial allotments were clearly ensribed in a claendar of things 
that had to be done prior to thesigning of the peace agreement. On the 
legislature, they had never felt that elections were possible at this 
time. Now the govt. had finally tabled the idea of an enlarged CND. THe 
RPF felt that political forces should be equally represented in the 
Assembly. If you kept the current CND that meant a house of 240 people. 
Bentley told Rwigamba of the New Hampshire House of 400 plus legislatures 
for 800,000 people. Rwigamba was also aware of thr MRD and PL statements 
denoucing the Fomin's position and wonderedwhom he rerpesented. Rawson 
pointed out that parties in a multi-party system could hold opinions 
different form that of their members in coalition government. It was 
clear that the Fomin still represented the Rwandan government and was 
taking instruction from its Prime Minister. In any case, Rawson argued, 
the international setting of these negotiations was guarantee that what 
was offered here and accepted here would endure regardless of political 
waves back in Kigali. He urged the RPF to understand that the Minister 
spoke authoritatively for the government and to work with h~ to get over 
the remaining obstacles to an agreement. Rawson asked Rwigamba if the 
RPF was really interested in reaching an agreement this round or if they 
preferred to come back after a period of reflection to deal with these 
issues. Rwigamba said that the RPF had come here to negotiate and wanted 
to leave with a signed protocol. Bentley pointed out that without that, 
by the time they came back to the table, the RPF might lose a lot of what 
they had worked so hard to get. 
That evening Fomin Nuglinzira gave a summary at plenary session of 
what had been decided betimes. This included agreement on the economic 
porgramforthe government, agreement on professional standards for 
national service, agreement on the specialized institutions and on how 
they fit in the intsitutional structure. The Government had also agreed 
to drop the insistence that the prime Minister be returned to office. It 
had been agreed that the new Prime Minister will be chosen from some 
party other than the President's. There was basic agreement on how the 
cabinetshould be distributed but a difference as to when portfolios 
whould actually be assigned to political forces. 
The Fomin then explained the government's position on the National 
Assembly. It had wanted an assembly that was representative of the 
People's wishes and had proposed direct elections in.· three months, then 
indirect elections, electoral college, consitutent assembly, a nominated 
second house with special powers and finally an expanded CND. The 
government was still looking for a compromise which RPF would accept. 
Patrick Maz~paka spoke for·· the RPF. Their idea on the government had 
been to have RPF share some of MRND portfolios. The government's 
breakdown of porfolio categories coincidentally matched their earlie; 
allocation. Now it was a matter of timing when the allocation should be 
made. On the National Assembly, the RPF had not expected to ever 
againdiscuss theCND after having accepted inthe first round the 
government's proposal of a national assembly of transition. The RPF was 
convinced that in the current political environment with the exclusion of 
an Lmportant part of the potential electorate and the security situation 
an e1ectoral process was not possible. He a1so exp1ained the prob1ems 
with a nominated second house, nor were they happy about one house 
dominated by one party. They were still looking for ways to set up the 
National Assembly and he said, "We will find them." 
Tuesday, October 27 
At breakfast, observers were informed that the promised plenary that 
evening was to be instead an acceptance ana signing of the JPMC reports. 
Rawson told Fomin Nuglinzira that this was not acceptable. Observers 
needed to be officially informed of what progress there was in 
negotiations, even if there was not any. Rawson called Amb. Mpungwe over 
tothe table and secured the facilitator's agreement that the evening 
session would include a report on negotiations. 
An hour and a half late, the plenary began with Fomin Ngulinzira again 
giving the summary. Agreement had been reached on the presidential oath, 
on ~unities for the President and other high officials, on attaching 
presidential Offices of Information and Tourism to theiR respective 
ministries, and on the organization of judicial power. The Fomin then 
went into a long explanation of duties and powers of the Supreme Court as 
well as qualifications and means of nominating its officers. He promised 
that negotiations would resume on cabinet portfolios and on the National 
Assembly tomorrow. 
Commissioner BizLmungu offered three observations: That they had 
indeed been cleaning up some periferal matters in a spirit of frankness 
and friendship; that they would await any government proposals on 
government portfolios or the National Assembly but if there were no 
forwardmovement on these issues, the RPF porposed a pause and a third 
round which would include these element plus refugee questions; and that 
given Habyrimana's agreement to meet with Kanyarengwe, that the two 
leaders chair this next round so as to help draw together these seemingly 
intractable issues. 
Fomin Nuglinzira did not think the matters recently negotiated to be 
periferal but central to the functioning of a new institution they had 
agred on--the Supreme Court. He noted that the government had offered 
many proposals for compromise on the National Assembly and the RPF had 
not offered anything other than its original idea of a nominated 
assembly. He also remarked with some asperity that h~ was not in 
position to determine who would lead the Gvoernment's delegation the next 
round and claLmed ignorance of any offer by Habyr~ana to meet with 
Kanyarengwe. He hoped the meetings tomorrow would prove fruitful. The 
plenary adjourned with words of encouragement from Ambassador Fall 
especially to reach agreement on modalities and timing of portfolio 
allocations on which the parties seemed so close to agreement. 
Wednesday, October 28 
facilitator Mpungwe told me mid-day that the Tanzanian Ambassador to 
Kigali had met with President Habyar~ana. the president said he could 
not accede to RPF demands on the National Assembly. thecouncil of 
Ministers was deadlocked. He bel~eved that the negotiations should have 
a recess. The Pr~e Minister on the other hand wanted a protocol signed 
and told the Fomin to work out any arrangement he could. the President 
thought it was not fair to burden one man with such responsibility. The 
Rwandan needed to work out a common solution to this. Mpungwe had 
checked with both sides and they ag~eed to initial what they had already 
negotiated as soon as documents could be prepared. The parties were 
however still meeting to discuss issues. Thomas Kalisa told Rawson they 
were still hoping for some "surprises" at plenary that evening. 
At the Plenary, however, the Minister simply explained that the two 
parties intended to sign a for.mal protocol on Power Sharing--Part I. 
Negotiations would resume in 15 days dealing with refugees issues, 
formation of the interim government and nature and functions of the 
interim National Assembly. Bizimungu spoke at length about the kind of 
issues involved in the refugee question. There were numerous inquiries 
from observers regarding the time-table and whether neighboring states 
and refugee organizations: could be prepared in two weeks to address 
refugee issues. The Fomin suggested an alternate schedule in which 
formation of government and National Assembly would be dealt then 
military integration opened during two week's discussions followed by 
another pause before concluding work on the military and treating refugee 
issues. Bizimungu expressed the hope that negotiations could be 
completed in time to give the Rwandan people a Christmas present of 
peace. 
Thursday, October 29 
The day was spent in preparing the draft protocol and communique. in 
the evening Amb. Mpungwe wanted to talk about alternatives for the 
National Assembly. Rawson pointed out that an elective process would 
have by constitutionally moving the CND aside would have avoided the 
political dilemmas that have stalled current negotiations. Further, in 
our view, processes of conflict resolution should move quickly through to 
elections so as to break political deadlock and remove ambiguities of 
mandate. Mpungwe made all the standard arguments why elections would be 
counter productive in the Rwandan situation. Ugandan High Commissioner 
to Tanzania supported his arguments. Rawson argued that the important 
thing was to listen to all sides and try to understand why Habyrimana has 
problems with an appointed legislature. We were negotiating in a 
political marketplace and shouldtry to arange a deal that did not exclude 
anyone or leave somethinking they had been had by the process. It seems 
apparent that Impungwe will push for a new totally nominated legislature 
when his President sees Ruhigira. Rawson urged that someway be devised 
to keep key members of the CND in the political process and hence 
committed to the peace accord. 
in conversations with Fomin Diria, Rawson found him favoring the 
government position against early distribution of portfolios but against 
an electoral process that could challenge and upset the delicate 
power-sharing balance which was being put together in the government. He 
had some ideas of a two-level legislative process with a "national 
conference" handling legislative issues related to the interim process. 
This idea had already been tried out in the government's two-house 
proposal and rejected. Diria may not have beenmade aware of this due to 
his extended absence from the negotiations. 
